Majority Opinion:
a.    Because of problems with the Roth standard, a new three-part
test [the Miller test] shall be used in defining “obscenity”:
(1)  The “average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that “the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest” [citing Roth];
(2)  The work “depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual     conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,”
AND
(3)  The work, taken as a whole, lacks “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.”
Examples of what a state statute could regulate under (2) above
include:  “Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or stimulated,” or
“Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”
b. The majority explicitly rejected the argument that what appeals to
the “prurient interest” or is “patently offensive” should be
determined by reference to a national standard. What counts are the
standards of the local community where the prosecution is taking
place. Thus “the people of Maine or Mississippi [need not] accept the
public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or in New
York City.”
1.  The “local community” standard is a response to Harlan’s
concurrence/dissent in Roth re the “deadening uniformity” of federal
obscenity laws.
c. At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive descriptions of sexual
conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value to merit First Am. protection.  For ex., a medical
books for the education of Drs. using graphic illustrations and
descriptions of human anatomy are not obscene under this def.
1.    Miller thus extends the definition of obscenity to include
those works which are not “utterly” without social value, but which
do not have “serious” value.
2.    This point re medical books is a response to Warren’s
concurrence in Roth.
d.  The states may ban as obscene only depictions or descriptions of
“hard core” sexual conduct. Since the states must be specific about
what sexual conduct is being banned (in order to satisfy the First
Amendment need for “fair notice” of what is forbidden, and in order
to avoid a chilling effect on expression), the Court provided several
examples of materials which could be banned (see above examples
referring to “(2)” part of test for what could constitutionally be
labeled “hardcore”).  Thus, no one is subject to prosecution for
obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe “hard
core” sexual conduct that is specifically defined in the regulating
state’s law.